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abstract 
 
This text discusses how our understanding of authorship has evolved over the past 
few decades and how this process is now being effected by developments in 
network and communications technologies. Situating the discussion in relation to 
post-structuralist theory, Actor Network Theory and the anthropological work of 
James Leach the impact of network technologies are considered, with particular 
attention to the emergence of distributed forms of authorship and models of 
expanded agency. 
 
The work of two artists who engage network and communications technologies in 
distinct ways is discussed in order to evoke perspectives on emergent forms of 
authorship and agency. The work of Mez Breeze is considered as evidencing a 
shift in authorship from the human author to an agency of computability embedded 
in the formal structures of the language employed in the work, suggesting that the 
text operates as an automatic generative system that constructs the reader as 
computational interpreter. 
 
The Megafone mobile communications project by Antonio Abad and Eugenio 
Tisselli is discussed as an activity where authorship is distributed across a 
population of people connected to and mediated by mobile network technologies. 
The existence of a networked community operating as an automatic generative 
system is considered as a form of expanded agency where subject, agency and 
community are evoked as an autopoietic apparatus. 
 
The text concludes by identifying the argument as a set of complex interactions 
that can be seen not only as agents of creation but also as a creative outcome. It is 
suggested that the outcome of a creative act is not necessarily the primary 
expression of creativity but rather incidental to a process that is itself creative 
agency. 
 Introduction 
 
The identification of the author as the primary source of agency in the existence of a 
creative work has been widely contested. Philosophers have perennially questioned the 
nature of agency, its origins and effects. Authorship and agency can be considered to be 
deeply connected. Following on from Barthes "death of the author" numerous cultural 
theorists and critics have called for expanded definitions of authorship. Social scientist 
Bruno Latour has described an expanded definition of agency that can allow us to reflect 
upon its diffuse character. He argues for an appreciation of agency that includes not only 
people but also systems, instruments and networks (Latour 2005). Thus authorship and 
agency can be regarded as diffuse and distributed in their relations and origins. In such 
a field of expanded agency any action, and the subsequent outcomes, can be seen to 
originate from, or within, non-conventional, diffused and difficult to identify sources – 
from various devices, machines, apparatus, networks, communities and the relationships 
between these and other forms of agency. 
 
What happens to creative works when they emerge from such diffused sources of 
agency and authorship? Can we still consider authorship a principle factor in the genesis 
of the work, or is it only one modality of generation from which the work can emerge? 
Amongst the most visible of the probable modalities of creation is the agency conferred 
through automated systems. We are familiar with robots in industry and computers all 
about us. We accept that our tele-visual and cinematic worlds are commonly mediated 
by synthetically generated or hybrid representations. The Golem figure of Jewish myth is 
transposed into the computer generated Golem of the Lord of the Rings film, one part 
human (the movement part acquired through motion capture of an actual human actor) 
and the rest computer visualisation. This binary identity could be seen to confuse our 
argument, the synthetic "flesh" and "bone" of the Golem character animated through the 
agency of human intent and action, if it were not the case that many of the 
representations and characters we perceive or interact with, in film, video and computer 
games, are largely synthetic in their composition. It is also the case that many such 
"avatars" are also synthetic in their genesis, created automatically, as required, by the 
same software systems that visualise and animate them. Here agency is clearly not of 
the human, or supra-human, but of the machine. Creation is no longer, if it ever was, 
primarily a gift of the human. 
 
However, to assume that the machine has some special characteristics that allow it to 
assume this role, or for us to assign agency to it, is to miss the point. It is not the 
machine that is the source of agency, no more than the human is its exclusive source. 
Although, historically, philosophers have sought to understand agency in relation to 
supra-human and human origins this is not where it has lain. Rather, agency and 
creativity are not the function of people, nor even communities of people, although 
individuals and communities can evoke and embody such agency, but of the relations 
between things - things that can be of diverse origins and character. 
 
What happens to the readers of works of expanded agency? To what degree are the 
readers and the works mutually reflexive nodes in the creative network or field? If 
readers are also agents in the network of relations around the work is it reasonable to 
regard them as rhizome like nodes or threads within that network, compelling us to adopt 
a Deleuzian apprehension of creativity and its origins? If so how does this effect reading 
and our sense of self as reader? 
 
Authenticity and originality 
 
Notions of authenticity and originality have been widely contested. Barthes argued that 
the text and its author need not be co-related and that the reader's comprehension of the 
text was possibly the more important element in considering the 'authoring' and thus the 
origins of the work (Barthes 1978). Whilst this is a valuable contention that permits 
insight into how artifacts and texts might come into being and be understood, in context, 
it does not facilitate an approach to the subject that might allow an unpacking of the 
complex set of relationships around a creative work within a view that could 
accommodate a concept of expanded agency. 
 
Reader Reception Theory situates our apprehension of the work within the processes of 
reading, contextualising and rendering interpretation as contingent upon an 
understanding of the reader, thus further shifting the balance of authorship from author 
to reader (Jauss 1982). Other approaches to the question of authorship can be found 
within the field of Social Epistemology (Fuller 1988), following on from Foucault's view of  
knowledge as socially contingent and ultimately of variable status, dependent on the 
discursive and epistemic formation of the social domain a defined knowledge system 
operates within (Foucault 1970). 
 
The work of the Australian artist and writer Mez Breeze makes an interesting example 
here. Its proto-private use of language, employing forking hermeneutic avenues 
embedded within one another, in recursive Borgesian knots, suggests an approach to 
language that contests and illuminates the manner in which Foucault regards knowledge 
and information as social dynamics. What happens to the reader's sense of the text and 
their own relation with it when they are uncertain whether they are understanding the 
language the author is employing, much less feel confident they are constructing a 
coherent reading that might come into play against that of the author's writing/reading? 
Where does the reader situate agency in relation to such texts? How does the reader 
situate themselves in relation to the domain to which the text appears to belong? 
 
 
-- 
start: blipdaybleed[ing]s_in2_twilightningnite. 
-- 
w[standard.g]ait: 
rodbackplat[erra]forming+[e]bonymoutheve[lvet]sdropping. 
-- 
run:  /loc shunting.in2.b[ody]roadcorporateseating; 
copperslitegl[m]ares.vs.t[golden_l]ight.sun.eye.coins; 
r[g]e[nu]flect + clouddrown. i 
twist+[socially.basted]tur[key]n; 
bod[dit]ymashing/[w]retching/f[t]umbling; 
purrfe[t]ctdayslurrs.in2.nite[moan]cloakingslategrey[de]vices.  
-- 
 
text by Mez Breeze, 2009 
 
Breeze's works exist somewhere between language and code. Their basic structure this 
textual and possibly best regarded as a poem but such texts would not sit comfortably 
with many definitions of what a poem can be, closely resembling pieces of executable 
code or computer programming functions. In the above text the first section begins with 
the term "start", a common command in various computer languages, denoting the 
beginning of a piece of code with a definable functionality, followed by what could be 
interpreted as a line of text declaring a number of variables to be used in the following 
function. The next section of the text starts with the term "run", explicitly evoking the idea 
of executable code. When programmers execute their code they speak of "running" it. In 
what sense is Breeze using the term? Is this meant to be executable code? If so then 
the machine that could run it is not like most computers. It would seem safest to assume 
the platform and operating system this piece of code is destined for is of the reader's 
mind, an imaginary machine the reader is required to construct in order to interpret the 
text. 
 
Here Breeze could be proposing that all the texts we read involve the reader 
constructing a virtual machine in order for the text to be interpreted. That is to say, each 
act of reading requires that we create an instance of language as a process of 
interpretation, with some texts demanding more ingenious and novel design than others. 
Such texts, demanding the reader construct something that for many is perceived as a 
given, something they learned as a child, forces them to reconsider what it is to read and 
to recognise that within reading's processes the reader is engaged in an act of 
imagination incorporating a constant reimagining of language. In the case of a text, like 
the one above, is a knowledge of computer programming likely to enhance our 
appreciation of the work? Is Breeze's poetic code primarily intended for the hacker and 
coder? Or is this incidental? One thing that does stand out is that the text seems to 
question its own agency. If it is executable, even if only by an imaginary machine, then is 
the latent agency that might be released at the moment of reading the text something 
that is inherently automatic, the text being executable and thus potentially self-reading 
and self-realisable. Is this writing that writes itself? If so then its agency is deeply 
problematised, shifting relations between writer, reader and text. 
 
Umberto Eco proposed the open work of art (Eco 1989), arguing that no artwork is ever 
complete, being continually open to change through processes of interpretation and 
contextualisation. In this view all art can be considered intrinsically participatory and, to 
some extent, collective in its authorship. 
 
Mez Breeze's work, always seeming to be in the process of changing, of executing itself, 
remains fluid and open and thus evokes Eco's concept of the open work in an explicit 
manner. However, whereas some artist's and author's work is materially dynamic 
Breeze's does exist as a fixed text. It is just at the moment of reading that its multi-
threaded and interwoven structure, within a progressively contingent form, becomes 
evident, its static material state emphasising its latent dynamism and openness. 
Breeze's texts are designed as codes to be run, but only within the context of the virtual 
machine the reader imagines in order to untangle the potential texts that arise from any 
reading. Breeze's intent becomes clear as she reveals the reader's own role in 
constructing a linguistic platform, or "interpreter" (another term from computer 
programming, denoting a piece of software which can interpret code and execute it), with 
which they can produce an interpretation. The reader is forced to observe the processes 
by which the text is realised, in their imagination, as they are disallowed any opportunity 
to rely upon many of the conventional forms of words and texts informing the meaning. 
That every reading requires several parallel texts to be kept in play, at the same time, 
functions to reveal the multi-dimensional nature of the mental construct the reader must 
sustain, and how this construct has to be able to change orientation, in order to account 
for the multiple legible texts any one reading might evoke. 
 
Breeze's work can therefore be understood as self-reflexive and demanding of a similar 
reflexivity from the reader. The question therefore arises whether all texts have within 
them this property, with Breeze's texts particularly explicit examples. It could be argued 
that creative works exist within and of a field of social engagement, the space of reading 
and writing, which is itself reflexive. That is, creativity can be considered as both the 
outcome of social relations and the stuff that enables those relations to be. Further to 
this, this argument can be proposed within an expanded field of what a social network or 
community might be, accepting Latour's proposition of expanded agency, including, 
within the warp and weft of such networks, not only individual people but also the 
devices and systems that function to facilitate and augment the dynamic such creative 
communities are constituted as. Within this understanding of creative communities 
classic social constitutions, such as neighborhood relationships or familial structures, 
can be considered as of equal relevance to virtually constituted communities in online 
environments, such as Second Life, or the Twitterer and their followers – noting that the 
followed Twitterer will likely be following one or more of their followers in a reflexive, 
discursive and virtual social dance of plastic form. It might be observed that much of the 
creative value generated, the object of contemplation or excitement, is not associated 
with the followed, or even the follower, but the ever changing patterns and shapes 
inscribed by the dynamically evolving social relations enacted in the Twitter environment. 
This is an automatic social technology at work, emergent properties arising from its 
dynamic form. 
 
Networks as agency 
 
As has already been observed, we can consider creativity and knowledge formation as 
forms of social interaction rather than the outcomes of social activities. Creative social 
interaction occurs in communities that develop and evolve as cultural paradigms 
crystallise or dissipate. This is most probably a reflexive process involving complex 
interactions of agency. Particular creative communities can act as a lens through which 
social change may be observed. Examples from networked culture, in addition to those 
previously described, include large scale communities of dispersed interests such as 
Facebook and specialist communities with finely focused interests, such as the 
community of creative practitioners, working with networked technologies, associated 
with Rhizome (Rhizome 2009). 
 
Thus, whilst we commonly perceive creativity as the product of the individual artist, or 
creative ensemble, from this perspective creativity can also be considered an emergent 
phenomenon of communities, driving change and facilitating individual or ensemble 
creativity. Creativity can be a performative activity released when engaged through and 
by a community. Thus creativity can be understood as a process of interaction. 
 
In this context the model of the solitary artist, producing artifacts that embody creativity, 
can be questioned as an ideal for achieving creative outcomes. Instead, creativity can be 
proposed as an activity of exchange that enables (creates) people and communities, 
regarding these elements as aspects of agency within an expanded field of what agency 
can be considered to be. Anthropologist James Leach, in his book Creative Land (2003), 
observes and describes cultural practices where the creation of new things, and the 
ritualised forms of exchange enacted around them, function to "create" individuals and 
bind them in social groups, thus "creating" the community they inhabit. Leach's argument 
is an interesting take on the concept of the gift-economy. Given this understanding, it is 
possible to conceive of creativity as emergent from and innate to the interactions of 
people. Such an understanding can combat an instrumentalist views of creativity, as 
often promoted by governments and corporations who demand of artists that their 
creations have social (eg: "economic") value. In the argument proposed here, creativity 
is not valued as arising from a perceived need, a particular solution or product, nor from 
a supply-side "blue skies" ideal, but as an emergent property of communities. 
 
Complicating this field of fluid relations further are the implications of what happens 
when forms of agency are incorporated into the network of relations that underpin 
creative activity which are artificial systems or artifacts in their own right. As has already 
been noted, networks of agency can, and often do, include non-human agents in their 
constitution. 
 
In this context we can again ask what "creativity" is? We can seek to situate it as an 
activity defined by and defining of communities, transcending the debate on the 
instrumentality of creativity and knowledge and situating innovation as an ontological 
factor in the formation of communities. An analysis of creativity as a performative is 
possible. This approach allows for the deconstruction of traditional perceptions of 
creative activities and the development of a less reductive understanding of its value. 
This leads directly to fundamental questions regarding the public value of creativity and 
the role it plays in creating communities - with creativity proposed as a process of 
becoming for individuals and communities, where immanence can be regarded as 
interaction between various agents leading to the realisation of self through the 
exchange of symbolic value. The intention here is not to evoke the Deleuzian abstraction 
of a "plane of immanence" but to socially situate self and other within the play of 
relationships between individuals and communities, with the role of creativity thus 
emerging as an ontological determiner. The cultural economies described by Leach are 
the more relevant examples. 
 
The collaborative web based artwork Megafone (2009), by the Spanish artist Antoni 
Abad and Mexican artist Eugenio Tisselli, explicitly engages the dynamics of individual 
and collective immanence. The stated aim of the project is simple - to give a voice to 
those who normally exist at the margins of society. However, the means by which this is 
achieved, employing multimedia network and mobile communication technologies to 
situate individual and collective identity within specific and diverse geo-cultural contexts, 
ensures that the work goes beyond its stated objective to become a meditation upon the 
performative potential of communications technologies in the becoming of individuals 
and communities within a globalised cultural economy. 
 
The work involves the artists travelling to meet with and, to a degree, embed themselves 
within particular communities, whether they be sex workers in Madrid, motorcycle 
couriers in Sao Paulo or Sahrawi refugees in the Algerian Sahara. Integrating aspects of 
Google Earth, image and video uploading capabilities familiar from social technology 
websites such as Flickr  and YouTube, ethnographic media recording methods, meta-
tagging and the World Wide Web as the primary means of realisation and diffusion, the 
artists have facilitated a series of intimate views of the lives and experiences of the 
communities and individuals they have worked with. The voices we hear and the images 
we see are those of the participating individuals. Those involved record their own video 
and sound files, make their own photographs documenting their lives, selecting what 
they upload, tagging files with related information and determining how they link 
together, ensuring that the artists, whilst the initiators and facilitators of the projects, 
remain in the background, their authorial eye distanced and muted by the direct 
engagement of the participants. What emerges are individual and collective vocabularies 
which converge as folksonomies and allow their stories to unfold from within (Tisselli 
2008). This simple strategy functions to defer the potential for the voyeuristic gaze to 
impose itself upon the participants, who at no time emerge as the subjects of the work 
but clearly retain their identities and authorial stature throughout all the material 
associated with what are by necessity somewhat sprawling database-like artifacts. 
 
Such an approach to the projects realised within Megafone allows multifaceted 
documents of communities and their individual members to emerge which fit well in 
relation to recent ethnographic documentary film-making but also situates itself as 
networked artifact. The multi-layered means by which the data can be navigated, 
through following the communications of specific individuals or thematically defined 
threads or by geographic relationships, encourages a rhizomic apprehension of how 
people communicate, represent themselves and situate each other relative to one 
another. In this respect the work goes beyond the general aim of ethnographic film-
making, seeking to give voice to the subject, and additionally focuses attention not on 
the individual voices following on from one another, constrained within the linear medium 
that is film, but rather the complex inter-relationships the possessors of these voices 
have and how it is in these relationships that they and their community are forged. The 
various recordings we encounter in this work are not only the outcome of individuals 
seeking to present us with their experiences and reflections but evidence of the 
economy of signs that exist within the particular community and which are the means 
through which that collective experience presents as shared information and brings itself 
into being in the communicative. 
 
Although Megafone, as we experience it online, is not the outcome of the careful 
consideration we are familiar with in conventional artistic methodologies, such as a well-
crafted composition or well-judged framing of a photograph, nevertheless conjunctions of 
material emerge from the database of images, videos and audio recordings that are as 
striking and poignant as the most carefully considered photo-journalistic image. This 
could be taken as evidence that many of the emotions we associate with experiencing 
the outcomes of creative activity, such as beauty, awe, the abject or fear, are not the 
preserve of individual artistic intent but rather the consequence of creativity in any form, 
whether manifest as directed collective activity or emergent from complex social 
interactions and representations. In this sense creativity can be regarded not only as the 
outcome of normal and everyday non-privileged human activity but as the default state 
of human interaction and experience. 
 
One particular page that can be generated when viewing the Megafone website, in a 
section created by a group of Algerian refugees, and which can only be generated 
through the selection of particular and perhaps unrepeatable navigational choices, 
results in the image of a lone child sitting in a relaxed pose upon the desert sand. Co-
located on the page with this image is what we can assume is a Google Earth image 
indicating the child's location at the margins of a large sprawling refugee camp, itself lost 
in the empty expanse of the Saharan desert, scarred with the fine tracery of human 
activity. Whilst these images are the outcomes of human (inter)actions their co-location 
is the result of an automated system that has searched a database to assemble the final 
webpage. The Google Earth image is also the product of an automated apparatus 
located at a great distance to the subject, the framing and cropping a further byproduct 
of automated processes. This conjunction of automatic and distancing processes 
nevertheless lead us to a poignant composition that speaks volumes about the 
predicament of this child and the community to which they belong and would seem to 
present, through a profound economy of means, the summary intent of the Megafone 
project, addressing as it does the socially marginalised within a global context. This 
outcome is not an accident but nor could it have been foreseen by either the participants 
or the facilitating artists. It is an emergent consequence from within a complex set of 
social and automatic interactions and, as such, an example of networked agency. 
 
 
screen grab of webpage produced from database whilst navigating Megafone website 
 
Conclusion 
 
The intention here has been to look at a number of key factors in how creativity and its 
outcomes function within communities, accepting that individuals, collectives, social 
networks and automated systems all need to be part of the analysis. The objective has 
not been to define, isolate and address each of these as forms of distinct agency but 
rather to seek an apprehension of the dynamics involved in creativity and creation as an 
interplay of all these, and other, factors. The key argument has been that it is in the 
complex interactions of numerous elements that a pattern can be seen to emerge that 
could be considered not only as the agent of creation but also as the creative outcome 
itself. In this context it is proposed that the artifact, or whatever the commonly accepted 
outcome of a creative process is, is not the embodiment or final expression of creativity 
but rather an incidental by-product of a process that is itself the creation and creative 
agency - a process that remains persistently open in its dynamic. 
 
Edinburgh, March 2010 
 
Presented as a guest lecture at Critical Mobilities: a Society for the Humanities 
conference on thought, culture and performance, Cornell University, April 29-30 2010 
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